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Abstract
Hamilton introduced two conceptions of social fitness, which he called neighbour-
modulated fitness and inclusive fitness. Although he regarded them as formally
equivalent, a re-analysis of his own argument for their equivalence brings out two
important assumptions on which it rests: weak additivity and actor’s control. When
weak additivity breaks down, neither fitness concept is appropriate in its original
form. When actor’s control breaks down, neighbour-modulated fitness may be ap-
propriate, but inclusive fitness is not. Yet I argue that, despite its more limited
domain of application, inclusive fitness provides a distinctively valuable perspective
on social evolution.
1 Introduction
W. D. Hamilton is rightly celebrated as the progenitor of modern social evolution theory.
This symposium marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of his seminal article, “The
Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour” (1964). It is a paper bursting with ideas, many
of which were hugely innovative at the time. Perhaps the best known is the principle now
called Hamilton’s rule, which states that a social behaviour will be favoured by natural
selection if and only if rb > c, where c is the fitness cost to the organism that performs
the behaviour, b is the fitness benefit the trait confers on another organism, and r is the
coefficient of relatedness.
I have discussed this idea elsewhere (Birch 2014a; Birch and Okasha 2015), but here
I want to focus on two other major innovations. For in the same paper, Hamilton intro-
duced two alternative ways of thinking about fitness in the context of social evolution. He
called them inclusive fitness and neighbour-modulated fitness (Hamilton 1964, 5-6), and
they continue to be the most commonly used fitness concepts in social evolution research.
Hamilton chose to focus on developing the inclusive fitness approach, and this con-
tinues to be the better known of the two. By the mid-1990s, however, the neighbour-
modulated fitness approach had inconspicuously grown into a full-blown rival framework
(Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1998), and in recent years it has become preferred method-
ology of many social evolution theorists (Taylor et al. 2007; Wenseleers et al. 2010; Frank
2013).
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This has led to discussion of the relationship between the two fitness concepts. The
key questions are: When are they equivalent for the purpose of calculating gene frequency
change? When do they come apart? And when the choice between them is not forced
by considerations of accuracy, which fitness concept is preferable? Here I revisit some of
Hamilton’s early papers in order to bring his own work to bear on these questions. In
short, I will argue that although the neighbour-modulated fitness concept has a wider
domain of application than the inclusive fitness concept, the latter remains distinctively
valuable in those cases to which it does apply.
2 The Conceptual Contrast
To understand the difference between the two fitness concepts, consider two perspectives
on what happens when altruism evolves due to genetic relatedness between organisms.
One is to view relatedness as a source of correlated interaction: when r is high, bearers
of the genes for altruism are more likely to interact with organisms who express that
same gene, and hence are more likely to receive the benefits of altruism. Thus bearers
of the genes for altruism may have greater reproductive success, on average, than non-
bearers. The other is to view relatedness as a source of indirect reproduction: when r is
high, recipients provide actors with an indirect means of securing genetic representation
in future generations. Thus the genes for altruism may spread if the representation
an altruist secures through helping its relatives exceeds the representation it loses by
sacrificing a fraction of its own reproduction success.
The first perspective is captured in Hamilton’s neighbour-modulated fitness approach,
which analyses the correlations between an individual’s genotype and its social neighbour-
hood in order to predict when these correlations will give bearers of the genes for altruism
greater reproductive output, on average, than non-bearers (Hamilton 1964; Taylor and
Frank 1996; Frank 1998). The second perspective is captured in Hamilton’s inclusive fit-
ness approach, which adds up all the fitness effects causally attributable to a social actor,
weighting each component by a coefficient of relatedness, in order to calculate the net
effect of a social behaviour on the actor’s genetic representation in the next generation
(Hamilton 1964; Frank 1998; Grafen 2006)
To pre-empt some misunderstandings, I should explain what these fitness concepts
are not. First, neighbour-modulated fitness is not simply a new name for classical in-
dividual fitness. Neighbour-modulated fitness assumes that an individual’s reproductive
success can be decomposed into a sum of components, each attributable to a particu-
lar neighbourhood phenotype, plus a “baseline” component that is independent of what
these neighbours do. Since the classical Darwinian fitness concept does not make any
such assumption about the causal structure of fitness, it would be incorrect to simply
equate the two (cf. Marshall 2015, 57-58).
Second, inclusive fitness is not simply an organism’s classical individual fitness plus
the classical individual fitness of its relatives, with the latter weighted by relatedness.
This was never Hamilton’s conception, and he avoided it with good reason. As Grafen
(1982, 1984) emphasizes, any adequate fitness concept must be such that if bearers of
one allele are, on average, fitter than bearers of another allele, then the former should be
selected. A simple weighted sum violates this constraint, essentially because it allows the
same offspring to be counted multiple times, once in computing the fitness of its parents,
and again (and again, and again...) in computing the fitness of any collateral relatives.
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This multiple-counting means that organisms with “bushier” family trees can be much
“fitter” than organisms with more sparse family trees, even though the bushiness of one’s
family tree makes no difference in itself to the future representation of one’s genes in a
population.
What Hamilton (1964) saw from the outset is that inclusive fitness must be defined in
a way that avoids multiple-counting. His solution was to assume that every organism’s
reproductive output can be written as a sum of components, each causally attributable
to the behaviour of a specific actor. Given this assumption, we can make sure that each
component is counted once and only once, by insisting that each component counts only
towards the fitness of the actor who was causally responsible for it. As Hamilton (1964)
himself put it:
Inclusive fitness may be imagined as the personal fitness which an individual
actually expresses in its production of adult offspring as it becomes after it has
been stripped and augmented in a certain way. It is stripped of all components
which can be considered as due to the individuals social environment, leaving
the fitness he would express if not exposed to any of the harms or benefits
of that environment. This quantity is then augmented by certain fractions of
the quantities of harm and benefit which the individual himself causes to the
fitness of his neighbours. The fractions in question are simply the coefficients
of relationship. (Hamilton 1964, 8)
Inclusive fitness is thus an inherently causal notion: a weighted sum of the fitness com-
ponents for which a given social actor is causally responsible.
Correlated interaction and indirect reproduction sound like very different processes,
and neighbour-modulated and inclusive fitness sound like very different concepts. Despite
this, the two are often considered formally equivalent, in the sense that they reliably yield
identical predictions regarding the direction of gene frequency change (Wenseleers et al.
2010; Gardner et al. 2011; Queller 2011; Marshall 2015). Yet there have always been
dissenters from the consensus. For example, Maynard Smith (1983) contrasted “the
exact ‘neighbour-modulated fitness’ approach” with “the more intuitive ‘inclusive fitness’
method” (1983, 315). He advocated inclusive fitness on the grounds that he considered
it easier to apply, but he thought it less accurate. More recently, Frank has advocated
the neighbour-modulated approach, claiming that “inclusive fitness is more limited and
more likely to cause confusion” (Frank 2013, 1172).
Hamilton (1964) claimed that the direction of selection can be calculated using either
fitness concept, but he provided no formal argument for their equivalence. He did, how-
ever, include such an argument in his (1970) paper on selfishness and spite. The (1970)
paper is quite brilliant: drawing on the work of Price (1970), Hamilton articulates clearly
and concisely the basic insights he had presented in a rather dense way in earlier work.
But perhaps the argument is a little too concise. As I will show, it leaves important
assumptions unarticulated.
3 Hamilton’s (1970) Argument Reconsidered
Here I reconstruct Hamilton’s (1970) argument for the formal equivalence of his two
fitness concepts.1 In doing so, I want to draw attention to two assumptions Hamilton
1Frank (1998) also reconstructs and discusses Hamilton’s model, though without drawing attention
to its assumptions.
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leaves implicit, since they point to important limitations of this equivalence.2
Consider a finite population of N numbered individuals. Let W toti represent the total
reproductive success of the ithindividual (“the recipient”), and let sij represent the addi-
tive effect of the social behaviour of the jthindividual (“the actor”) on the reproductive
success of the ithindividual.
We should pause here to consider the meaning of the sij. Hamilton (1970) simply
glosses the sij as “additive effects”. However, I suggest that, to do justice to Hamil-
ton’s explicitly causal conception of social fitness, we should interpret sij in explicitly
causal terms, as the causal effect of the jthindividual on the reproductive success of the
ithindividual. Roughly, it is the amount by which ithindividual’s reproductive success
would have differed had it never interacted with the jthindividual.
We can now return to the model. Let rij represent the coefficient of relatedness.
More precisely, let rij = Cov(qi, qj)/Var(qj), where qi is the recipient’s individual gene
frequency for a particular allele (i.e. its total number of copies of the allele divided by its
ploidy) and qj is the actor’s individual gene frequency. This is equivalent to the simple
regression (across all interacting pairs) of qi on qj
We can express W toti as a sum of additive causal effects attributable to distinct so-
cial actors, plus a term representing its baseline non-social fitness (αi), plus a residual
component (Wi) that represents deviations from fitness additivity:
W toti = αi +
∑
j
sij + Wi . (1)
Let us define the neighbour-modulated fitness of the ithindividual as its total repro-
ductive success as predicted by this additive causal model, neglecting the residual Wi :




If the residuals are all zero (i.e. Wi = 0 for all i), then an individual’s neighbour-
modulated fitness can be equated with its reproductive success. If Wi 6= 0, then
neighbour-modulated fitness can still be used to calculate gene frequency change accu-
rately provided the residuals do not co-vary with any genes. However, if these residuals do
co-vary with genes, neighbour-modulated fitness may mislead. At this point, a substan-
tive assumption of “additivity” is required. We must assume that the causal structure of
social interaction is such that Wi is either zero or, if non-zero, irrelevant to the direction
and magnitude of gene frequency change.
Now let us define the inclusive fitness of the jthindividual as its baseline fitness (αj)
plus the sum of all the additive causal effects (sij) for which it is responsible, weighted
in each case by the coefficient of relatedness rij:




We can now ask: under what conditions does Cov(WNMFi , qi) equal Cov(W
IF
j , qj)? This
is the crucial question as regards the “formal equivalence” of the two fitness concepts. It
turns out that, given one further important assumption, these quantities are equal.
2Readers wishing to avoid mathematical details may skip this section—but please note the two key
assumptions stated verbally at the end of it!
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First, we use our formal definitions of NMF and IF to split each covariance into a
non-social and social component:




















The non-social component is the same in both cases (since i and j are being used to label
elements of the same set, the difference in indices is merely notational). Hence only the
equivalence of the two social components needs to be established. Following Hamilton,
let us call these components (respectively) the “neighbour-modulated fitness effect” and
the “inclusive fitness effect”. Hamilton further simplifies matters by assuming α to be
a constant (of value 1), so that the non-social component is zero in both cases, but this
assumption is dispensable to the argument.

















Now note that, from the definition of relatedness as the simple regression of qi on qj, it
follows that
qi − q = rij(qj − q) + qi , (5)
where q denotes the extent to which the recipient’s actual genotype deviates from the







This key assumption, which Hamilton (1970) makes implicitly, amounts to assuming that
the recipient’s individual gene frequency predicts its social fitness only via correlations
with actors, and not via any other pathway (e.g. via conferring an ability on the recipient
to make better use of the help of others). This entitles us to substitute rij(qj − q) for





























Comparing this result to (2) and (3), we see that
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Cov(WNMFi , qi) = Cov(W
IF
j , qj), (9)
as we hoped to prove.
We can now see that Hamilton’s (1970) argument for the formal equivalence of
neighbour-modulated and inclusive fitness relies on two implicit assumptions, both of
which amount to assumptions of uncorrelated residuals:
• Additivity : Deviations from fitness additivity (Wi) are either zero or, if non-zero,
irrelevant to the direction and magnitude of gene frequency change.
• Actor’s control : The recipient’s genotype predicts its social fitness only via its
correlation with actor genotypes, and not via any other pathway (e.g. by enabling
it to make better use of the help received).
Hamilton is not alone in relying on these assumptions. More recently, Grafen (2006,
543-549) has provided an argument for formal equivalence that improves on Hamilton’s: in
particular, it accommodates uncertainty, and it accommodates the various social “roles”
an actor can occupy. Nevertheless, Grafen’s argument still relies on the assumptions
of additivity and actor’s control. The only difference is that, while Hamilton left these
assumptions implicit, Grafen makes them explicit.3
4 Actor’s Control and Additivity
Actor’s control points to one important qualification of Hamilton’s equivalence result. If
the recipient’s genotype predicts the fitness effects it receives in ways that are not fully
explained by correlations with actor genotypes, the result will be a situation in which
Cov(
∑
j sij, q) 6= 0. This is a situation in which neighbour-modulated fitness remains
valid, but in which inclusive fitness could lead to errors.
Such a situation may seem hard to visualize. But all it needs is for there to be
some genotype that, in addition to disposing an organism to express a social behaviour,
also affects its ability to receive the benefit of that behaviour when expressed in others.
Consider, for example, a genotype that disposes its bearer to produce an alarm call. In
so doing, it reveals the organism’s location to nearby predators, adversely affecting its
ability to benefit from the alarm calls of others. In this scenario, the benefit of receiving
an alarm call for a recipient does not just depend on properties of the actor. It also
depends on whether or not the recipient has itself produced an alarm call.
Let us turn now to additivity. We should distinguish here between strong and weak
varieties. If the deviation from additivity Wi is zero for all individuals, then we can say
that the structure of social interaction is strongly additive. If Wi is non-zero for at least
some individuals but makes no difference to changes in gene frequency, we can say that
the structure of social interaction is weakly additive. Either way, we are talking about a
property of the causal structure of social interaction in a population, not a property of
any particular organism or gene.
It is clear that real social interactions frequently violate strong additivity. For recall
what it requires: that an individual’s social fitness can be written, without remainder,
3Frank (1998) derives a qualified equivalence result that holds under similar assumptions in a frame-
work that incorporates class structure (discussed in Birch 2013).
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as a sum of components, each reflecting the causal influence of a particular social actor.
This is unlikely to be the case when cooperation takes the form of collaborative tasks
involving multiple actors, because task-structure tends to creates situations in which the
total payoff cannot be expressed as a sum of components, each corresponding to the
difference made by a single actor’s contribution (Birch 2012).
Weak additivity, however, is compatible with substantial deviations from the additive
causal model. Its tenability in any particular case depends on whether these deviations
co-vary with genes. This makes the empirical status of weak additivity difficult to assess.
We are often in a position to know empirically that a social interaction violates strong
additivity, since this depends only on the causal structure of the interaction, but we are
less often in a position to know whether or not the deviations from strong additivity
co-vary with any genes. I will not try to settle this empirical question here. Note,
however, that failures of weak additivity are clearly possible in principle whenever there
are deviations from strong additivity. We should therefore be cautious about assuming
weak additivity when strong additivity is violated.
These considerations broadly support the view that, as Grafen puts it, “the assump-
tion of additivity ... is not in general a realistic assumption. In many applications,
non-additivity is an important part of the problem” (Grafen 2006, 543; see also Queller
1985, 2011; Marshall 2015). What does this mean for our two conceptions of social fitness,
and for the relationship between them?
The immediate challenge is not to the formal equivalence of the two fitness concepts,
but rather to the generality of both. Hamilton formulated both fitness concepts in terms
of an additive causal model. If the model is inappropriate in some biological scenario,
then both fitness concepts as Hamilton originally conceived them are inappropriate in
that scenario.
Yet it would be wrong to conclude that the two fitness concepts are on a par when it
comes to accommodating deviations from additivity. A key difference is that neighbour-
modulated fitness, because it does not assume actor’s control, has more leeway for accom-
modating effects that depend on the behaviour of multiple actors. Neighbour-modulated
fitness requires that an individual’s fitness can be expressed as a sum of effects attributable
to properties of its social neighbourhood, but it does not require that each property is
controlled by a single actor. This means that, as Queller (1985, 2011) has shown, we
can augment the basic additive causal model with “synergistic effects” that depend in
complex ways on the phenotypes of multiple actors (see also Marshall 2015, 66-67). This
extended version of the neighbour-modulated fitness approach can handle cases in which
deviations from the additive causal model arise from synergistic interactions.
By contrast, the inclusive fitness concept relies fundamentally on the assumption that
each fitness effect can be attributed to a single controlling actor, whose inclusive fitness
it counts towards. Since synergistic effects are not controlled by any single actor, there
is no principled answer to the question of whose inclusive fitness they promote. In these
contexts, inclusive fitness, as Hamilton conceived it, is no longer a well-defined property
of an individual organism.
Thus, the two fitness concepts are threatened in different ways by failures of weak
additivity. Put simply: for neighbour-modulated fitness, the problem is a technical one
that can usually be surmounted by expanding the causal model of fitness. For inclusive
fitness, however, the problem runs deeper, for it is a problem of a conceptual nature. The
reassignment of fitness components to controlling actors that Hamilton envisaged is no
longer possible when the additive causal model fails.
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5 Inclusive Fitness, Adaptation and Selection-for
The bottom line is that, although neighbour-modulated and inclusive fitness are equiv-
alent in their predictions when weak additivity and actor’s control obtain, the inclusive
fitness concept has a more restricted domain of application.
One might take this as an argument for abandoning the inclusive fitness concept. Yet
I maintain that, for all its disadvantages, the inclusive fitness concept provides a distinc-
tively valuable perspective on social evolution. This is because it provides a perspective
from which we can make sense of altruistic (or indeed spiteful) behaviours as adaptations
that have been selected-for, rather than as traits that were selected merely because they
correlated with favourable social neighbourhoods (cf. Gardner 2009; West and Gardner
2013).
To make sense of this idea, let us briefly revisit Sober’s (1984) selection-for/selection-of
distinction:
To say that there is selection for a given property means that having that
property causes success in survival and reproduction. But to say that a given
object was selected [or “selected-of”] is merely to say that the result of the
selection process was to increase the representation of that kind of object.
(Sober 1984, 100, his italics)
As Sober (1984, 197) observes, it seems intuitively important to some trait’s being an
adaptation that it has been selected-for, and not merely selected-of.
Within this framework, we can see the dilemma that altruistic (or spiteful) traits
presented to biologists prior to Hamilton. On the one hand, these traits apparently could
not be adaptations, because they make no causal contribution to their bearer’s success
in survival and reproduction. On the other hand, if they were not adaptations, their
existence seemed to defy explanation.
Hamilton’s two conceptions of social fitness resolve this dilemma in subtly different
ways. Neighbour-modulated fitness offers one resolution: the property of being an altruist
is selected not because it causally promotes its bearers’ fitness but because, in populations
with the right kind of structure, it systematically correlates with receiving the benefits of
altruism in others. On this picture, it is the extrinsic property of having an advantageous
social neighbourhood that is selected-for, whereas having the trait oneself is selected only
because it correlates with this extrinsic property. If an individual could suppress its own
altruism without altering its social environment, it would increase its fitness by doing so.
From a neighbour-modulated fitness perspective, then, we can see why the property of
being an altruist is sometimes selected, but it is only ever selected-of.
By contrast, the inclusive fitness approach offers a resolution that puts selection-for
back at the centre of the picture. From an inclusive fitness perspective, a social trait that
detracts from the actor’s viability or fecundity may still contribute causally to its fitness,
and evolve for that reason, if the benefits of expressing the trait fall systematically on
genetic relatives. For this reason, I suggest, the inclusive fitness concept provides the
more satisfying resolution to the dilemma. It shows how being an altruist can be an
adaptation, not just a correlate of having a favourable social environment.
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6 Inclusive Fitness Maximization
A different way of arguing for the distinctive value of inclusive fitness is to argue that
organisms maximize this quantity, in a certain sense of the term (Grafen 2006). Hamilton
(1964, 1) himself made such a claim, writing that that populations satisfying the assump-
tions of his model “should tend to evolve behaviour such that each organism appears to
be attempting to maximize its inclusive fitness”.
Pinning down the sense of “maximization” at stake here is crucial in order to evaluate
Hamilton’s claim, since there are senses of the term on which inclusive fitness is clearly not
maximized (Birch 2016). In economics, it is common to model humans as “maximizing
agents” who make strategic choices that, within a set of feasible options, maximize a
quantity known as utility. Along similar lines, behavioural ecologists often assume that
organisms behave in ways that maximize, within a set of feasible options, their inclusive
fitness. Following Grafen (1984, 1999), we can call this an “individual as maximizing
agent” analogy.
What enables inclusive fitness to play this role as the putative “maximand” of animal
behaviour is its focus on which actors control which phenotypes. Because an actor’s in-
clusive fitness is a weighted sum of the fitness effects for which it is causally responsible,
we can put ourselves in the position of the actor and ask: “How should I behave, in or-
der to maximize my expected inclusive fitness?” Since this quantity is under the actor’s
control, this can serve as an informal route to predictions of how we should expect an
organism to behave. By contrast, we cannot usefully ask the same question with regard to
neighbour-modulated fitness, because an individual’s neighbour-modulated fitness con-
tains components over which it may have no control. All we can do is put ourselves in
the position of a recipient and ask: “What genotypes are correlated with good outcomes,
as far as my neighbour-modulated fitness is concerned?” But this heuristic is less intu-
itive, because considerations of causation and control are replaced by considerations of
statistical auspiciousness (cf. Gardner 2009; Marshall 2015).
Hamilton’s claim, as quoted above, appears to invoke an “individual as maximizing
agent” analogy. However, Hamilton provided no formal argument for its validity. What
he actually showed was that, within his one-locus model, the mean inclusive fitness of the
population increases until a local maximum is reached. Population geneticists have con-
structed numerous counterexamples to this sort of mean fitness maximization (reviewed
in Birch 2016), so this feature of Hamilton’s model cannot be considered a general truth
about the operation of natural selection.
Grafen’s (2006; 2014) “Formal Darwinism project” can be regarded as a sophisti-
cated attempt to vindicate the “individual as maximizing agent” analogy that Hamilton
verbally gestured towards. It aims to do this by forging links between formal representa-
tions of gene frequency change and optimal strategy choice. In a nutshell, Grafen aims
to prove that “natural selection always changes gene frequencies in the direction of in-
creasing inclusive fitness; and that a population genetic equilibrium in which no feasible
mutations can spread implies that the individuals in the population are each acting so as
to maximize their inclusive fitness.” (Grafen 2006, 543)
I have criticized the Formal Darwinism project elsewhere, and I cannot do justice
to this complex topic here (Birch 2014b, 2016). In short, Grafen does prove what he
aimed to prove, given a very specific and unorthodox understanding of the concept of
“equilibrium”. But the “equilibrium” concept that features in his links, defined in terms of
“scope” and “potential” for selection, is neither necessary nor sufficient for a population-
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genetic equilibrium in the usual sense. The true relationship between population-genetic
equilibria and inclusive fitness maxima is much more complicated than Grafen’s links
initially suggest.
Despite my doubts about Formal Darwinism, I remain convinced that the inclusive
fitness concept remains valuable. One reason is that a heuristic need not be completely or
even mostly reliable in order to warrant its continued use. If the “individual as maximizing
agent” analogy sometimes generates fruitful hypotheses, as it surely has done, then this
provides a pragmatic justification for its use as a method of hypothesis generation. We
do not need to put empirical projects on hold while we wait for a theoretical argument
to reassure us that the hypotheses thus generated will be correct.
More fundamentally, however, we can reject the idea that organisms in any sense
maximize their inclusive fitness and yet retain the idea that social traits are selected
because they causally contribute to this quantity. This milder claim is already enough to
make inclusive fitness valuable. For it allows us to see how social traits that detract from
their bearers’ classical fitness can be selected-for, not just selected-of, and it thus allows
us to see how such traits can be adaptations, regardless of whether or not they maximize
inclusive fitness.
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